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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The federal sentencing guidelines for environmental crimes bark loudly, 
calling for sentences of imprisonment for all but the most trivial of environmental 
offenses.1 Although the terms of imprisonment are not long, the prospect of even a 
short period of incarceration is doubtlessly capable of getting the attention of the 
white-collar professionals who commit environmental offenses.2 Research I 
conducted in 2004, however, indicated that the bark of the environmental 
guidelines was considerably worse than their bite.3 Judges “departed” below the 
applicable guidelines range in an unusually high percentage of environmental 
cases;4 barely one-third of convicted environmental defendants received prison 
                                                 
*  © 2009 Michael M. O’Hear, Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law, 
Marquette University Law School; J.D., B.A., Yale University; Editor, Federal Sentencing 
Reporter. I am grateful to Brian Borkowicz for excellent research assistance. 
1  Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, 
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 201 (2004). 
2  See id. at 145–46 (noting the belief that threat of prison is an especially valuable 
tool in controlling behavior of corporate officials). 
3  Id. at 206–07. 
4  Id. at 210. 
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sentences,5 and only about 40 percent of prison sentences exceeded one year in 
length.6 
Although the data contained in my 2004 study were striking at the time, 
ensuing developments might appropriately raise questions as to their reliability 
today. Most notably, the Supreme Court fundamentally restructured federal 
sentencing law through its 2005 decision in United States v. Booker, which 
changed the status of the federal sentencing guidelines from mandatory to 
advisory.7 Additionally, whereas the earlier study was largely based on data from 
the Clinton era,8 the Bush administration substantially modified federal charging 
and plea-bargaining policies, particularly with an eye toward reducing sentencing 
departure rates.9 Congress also has pressed this policy goal.10 Finally, eight years 
of Republican control of the White House undoubtedly resulted in significant 
changes in the ideological balance of the federal judiciary. 
With such developments in mind, the time is ripe for a new assessment of 
environmental sentencing practices. More specifically, my goals in this Article are 
twofold. Part II updates the data from my earlier study, demonstrating a surprising 
level of continuity from the Clinton to Bush presidencies, and from pre-Booker to 
post-Booker periods. Simply put, despite notable institutional and legal changes, 
the bark of the environmental guidelines remains considerably worse than their 
bite. Moreover, the data indicate that much of the lenience in environmental 
sentencing results from judges’ beliefs that the guidelines are too harsh in many 
cases. Part III discusses normative implications of the bark/bite gap. In light of the 
overarching purposes and premises of the federal sentencing system, the data 
provide important support for a fundamental redesign of the environmental 
guidelines. Failing such a redesign by the Sentencing Commission, the courts 
should regard the data as providing some support for arguments by individual 
defendants that particular provisions of the environmental guidelines should not be 
applied to them. 
A few caveats are in order. First, in such a politically charged area as 
environmental crime, I should be clear at the outset that I favor neither harsher nor 
                                                 
5  Id. at 205. 
6  Id. at 206. 
7  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
8  E.g., O’Hear, supra note 1, at 206 (reporting data from 1995–2001). 
9 See, e.g., Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to Federal 
Prosecutors Regarding Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, 
Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing, (Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 
129, 132 (2003) (“The Department has a duty to ensure that the circumstances in which it 
will request or accede to downward departures in the future are properly circumscribed.”). 
10  See, e.g., Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Sentencing 
Commission’s Response to the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 98, 98 (2003) 
(noting the 2003 Feeney Amendment was “intended to make it more difficult for federal 
district judges to grant downward departures from the Guidelines and for such departures 
to be upheld on appeal”). 
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more lenient environmental sentences. Rather, my primary interest here is in an 
environmental sentencing system that has more consistency, transparency, and 
moral credibility. Second, I consider only the sentencing of individual defendants, 
not corporations, which (having “no soul to damn and no body to kick”11) present 
quite different issues in the punishment context.12 Third, I consider only federal 
sentencing. State sentencing tends to be far more discretionary, with much less by 
way of formal or binding guidance,13 and thus raises a very different set of policy 
concerns. Finally, by “environmental crimes,” I mean only criminal violations of 
pollution control laws14—most notably, the Clean Air Act,15 the Clean Water 
Act,16 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.17 I do not include 
violations of the Endangered Species Act18 and similar statutes that are primarily 
intended to protect wildlife. 
 
II.  ASSESSING THE BITE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES AFTER BOOKER 
 
This Part presents updated data on federal environmental sentencing practices, 
focusing particularly on the post-Clinton, post-Booker period. The first Section 
presents background on the legal framework within which federal sentencing 
occurs. Although this background is necessary to understand the data contained in 
the second Section, readers who are already well-versed in the arcane law of 
federal sentencing may comfortably skip ahead. The second Section compares the 
Clinton-era data with the more recent 2004–2007 period, highlighting continuities 
between the periods. Long prison terms remain unusual in environmental cases, 
and sentences below the applicable guidelines range remain common. Finally, the 
third Section advances the “judicial discomfort” hypothesis: to an unusual degree 
                                                 
11  John Minkes, Book Review, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 418, 419 (2008) (reviewing 
CHRISTOPHER HARDING, CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE: INDIVIDUALS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2007)) (quoting eighteenth-century English judge, Baron 
Thurlow). 
12  See, e.g, Frank O. Bowman, III, Drifting Down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: 
Some Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal 
Sentencing, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 674 (2004) (“[Corporate] punishments, which 
necessarily take the form of monetary fines or legal prohibitions from engaging in certain 
activities, simply do not engage the emotions in the way that confinement of a human being 
in a cell does.”). 
13  See Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial 
Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 540–43 (2007) (noting only eighteen states 
have sentencing guidelines and discussing “substantial differences” even among those 
systems). 
14  For a brief summary of these laws, see O’Hear, supra note 1, at 140–43. 
15  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
16  33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
17  The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act is codified as part of the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006). 
18  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
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in the federal sentencing system, judges are uncomfortable with the 
appropriateness of the sentences called for by the environmental guidelines. 
 
A.  Legal Framework for Environmental Sentencing 
 
The federal sentencing guidelines employ a two-dimensional grid to 
determine sentence length.19 Knowing two variables, offense level and criminal 
history score, one can use the grid to determine the particular, narrow sentencing 
range that is applicable in a given case.20 Offense level is determined by reference 
to guidelines that are specific to different types of offenses.21 Thus, the basic 
pollution control crimes are currently handled by the set of three guidelines—
2Q1.1, 2Q1.2, and 2Q1.322—which I refer to collectively as the “environmental 
guidelines.” These guidelines identify a particular “base offense level” for three 
different sets of environmental offenses and indicate how the offense level should 
be adjusted depending on the presence of one or more “specific offense 
characteristics” (“SOCs”).23 
Although regarded as “mandatory” from the date of their implementation in 
1987, the federal guidelines were also interpreted to give judges a measure of case-
by-case discretion in deciding whether to sentence within the applicable guidelines 
range.24 Prior to Booker, two distinct types of “downward departure” were 
recognized and commonly used. First, with the government’s approval, a judge 
might impose a below-range sentence on the basis of a defendant’s “substantial 
assistance” to the government in apprehending or prosecuting another offender.25 
Second, with or without the government’s approval, a judge might depart on the 
basis of mitigating circumstances that were not adequately taken into account by 
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.26 Increasing departure 
rates in the 1990s prompted actions by Congress and the Bush administration to 
produce greater compliance with the guidelines by district court judges and line 
prosecutors.27 
                                                 
19  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2006) 
[hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL].  
20  See id. 
21  See id. at ch. 2, introductory cmt. 
22  See id. §§ 2Q1.1–2Q1.3 (describing offenses related to the mishandling of 
hazardous materials). 
23  See generally O’Hear, supra note 1, at 197–202 (discussing the environmental 
sentencing guidelines). 
24  See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92–100 (1996) (holding that 
departures from guidelines range must be reviewed by appellate courts using the abuse of 
discretion standard). 
25  SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 19, at § 5K1.1. 
26  Id. § 5K2.0(a)(1)–(3). 
27  Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 
U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 786–89 (2006). 
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Two years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker seemed to push in 
the opposite direction, albeit with uncertain force. Booker held that the mandatory 
federal guidelines, and particularly their use of judicial fact finding for the SOCs, 
violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial.28 The most uncertain 
question in Booker was what the remedy should be.29 Instead of ordering that jury 
fact-finding be engrafted onto the mandatory guidelines, the Court decided that the 
guidelines should be made merely advisory.30 The Court thus excised the portion 
of the Sentencing Reform Act (the “Act”) that required sentencing judges to 
impose a guidelines sentence unless the requirements for a departure were 
satisfied.31 However, the Court left in place other provisions of the Act that 
required the sentencing judge to “consider” the guidelines range and that 
authorized appellate review of sentencing decisions.32 The Court, in short, created 
something of a hybrid system that increased judicial discretion, but that also 
retained key features of the mandatory guidelines regime. Left for another day was 
any precise demarcation of how much judicial discretion was enhanced. 
After Booker, the rate of below-range sentences increased, although not 
dramatically.33 Most defendants still received within-range sentences.34 Indeed, 
most of the circuit courts of appeals adopted a “presumption of reasonableness” in 
favor of within-range sentences, while overturning variances with some 
frequency.35 
The Supreme Court addressed these practices in a trilogy of important 
decisions in 2007. First, in Rita v. United States, the Court upheld the presumption 
of reasonableness.36 Second, in Gall v. United States, the Court held that all 
sentences, including variances, must be reviewed using the same deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard.37 Finally, in Kimbrough v. United States, the Court held that 
a variance does not necessarily require there be something factually unusual about 
a case.38 Rather, in at least some circumstances, a sentencing judge may vary 
because he or she disagrees with a policy choice embodied in a guideline.39 
                                                 
28  543 U.S. 220, 226–27, 244 (2005). 
29  See id. at 245. 
30  Id. at 245–46. 
31  Id. 
32  18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4), 3742(a)–(b) (2006). 
33  See infra tbl.7. To reflect the change in legal standards, such sentences are now 
described as “variances,” not “departures.” 
34  Id. 
35  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007) (identifying circuits with 
presumption of reasonableness); Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5–6, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) 
(No. 06-5754) (discussing data on sentencing appeals post-Booker). 
36  551 U.S. at 344. 
37  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
38  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–02 (2007). 
39  Id. 
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While the precise import of Gall and Kimbrough is open to debate in some 
respects, the 2007 trilogy nonetheless clarified much regarding the post-Booker 
legal landscape. Whether the doctrinal clarification will have an impact at the 
district-court level remains to be seen. 
 
B.  The Updated Environmental Sentencing Data 
 
The Section presents United States Sentencing Commission data on 
environmental sentencing through fiscal year 2007, the most recent year for which 
data are available.40 For purposes of interpreting the data, the reader should bear in 
mind that Booker was decided midway through Fiscal Year 2005. 
Table 1 indicates the frequency of prison terms as a sentence.41 As in the 
1996–2001 period (the subject of my earlier study), only a little more than one-
third of environmental defendants received prison terms in the 2004–2007 period. 
In both periods, this percentage is far lower than was the norm for federal 
defendants generally (81.6 percent in 1996–200142 and 87.1 percent in 2004–
2007). Also of note in Table 1 is a drop in the number of sentenced environmental 
defendants, from an average of 110.5 per year in 1996–200143 to 85 in 2004–2007. 
 
Table 1—Environmental Defendants Sentenced to Prison Terms 
 
Fiscal Year Sentenced 
Environmental 
Defendants 
Environmental 
Defendants 
Receiving 
Prison 
Sentence 
Percentage of 
Environmental 
Defendants 
Receiving 
Prison 
Sentence 
Percentage  
of All 
Defendants 
Receiving 
Prison 
Sentence 
2004 85 32 37.6 85.7 
2005 89 32 36.0 87.3 
2006 89 39 43.8 87.7 
2007 77 23 29.9 87.5 
Total 340 126 37.1 87.1 
1996–200144 663 240 36.2 81.6 
 
                                                 
40  More specifically, this Section deals with cases in which the highest adjusted 
offense level was based on sections 2Q1.1, 2Q1.2, or 2Q1.3 of the sentencing guidelines. 
Sentencing Commission data are available online from the Federal Justice Statistics 
Resource Center (“FJSRC”) at http://fjsrc.urban.org. The data presented here were 
compiled from searches of the FJSRC database. 
41  This includes split sentences with a prison component. 
42  O’Hear, supra note 1, at 205. 
43  See id.  
44  The 1996–2001 data come from O’Hear, supra note 1, at 205. 
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Table 2 presents data on the length of prison terms for those who were 
sentenced to prison. The overwhelming majority (77.0 percent) received prison 
terms of two years or less. This is close to data from the 1995–2001 period, when 
80.5 percent of imprisoned defendants received terms of two years or less.45 As 
Table 3 indicates, the sentence lengths for environmental defendants are generally 
far less than for other federal defendants, most of whom received terms of more 
than two years in both 1995–2001 and 2004–2007.46 
 
Table 2—Length of Prison Term for Environmental Defendants Receiving 
Prison Sentence 
 
Fiscal Year 0–1 Year 
(Percent) 
1–2 Years 
(Percent) 
2–3 Years 
(Percent) 
3–5 Years 
(Percent) 
More Than 5 
Years 
(Percent) 
2004 50.0 28.1 9.4 12.5 0.0 
2005 43.8 28.1 15.6 3.1 9.4 
2006 35.9 43.6 17.9 2.6 0.0 
2007 43.5 34.8 21.7 0.0 0.0 
Average 42.9 34.1 15.9 4.8 2.4 
 
Table 3—Length of Prison Term for All Federal Defendants Receiving Prison 
Sentence 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
0–1 Year 
(Percent) 
1–2 Years 
(Percent) 
2–3 Years 
(Percent) 
3–5 Years 
(Percent) 
More Than 5 
Years (Percent) 
2004 19.7 21.4 14.2 13.1 31.5 
2005 20.0 21.0 14.1 12.7 32.2 
2006 18.8 20.7 14.0 12.8 33.7 
2007 20.0 19.9 13.2 12.7 34.1 
Average 19.6 20.8 13.9 12.8 32.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45  See id. at 206. 
46  The percentage in 1995–2001 was 57.2. See id. at 207. 
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Table 4 indicates one reason for the low sentences in environmental cases 
relative to other cases: environmental defendants tend to have much less serious 
criminal histories.47 The recent data are quite consistent with the 1995–2001 data.48 
 
Table 4—Criminal History of Sentenced Environmental Defendants  
and All Sentenced Federal Defendants 
 
Fiscal Year Sentenced Environmental 
Defendants in Category I 
(Percent) 
All Sentenced Defendants in 
Category I (Percent) 
2004 87.0 44.4 
2005 85.4 45.0 
2006 86.5 45.3 
2007 88.3 45.5 
Average 86.8 45.0 
1995–200149 88.3 54.5 
 
The relatively low criminal history of environmental defendants tends to 
produce relatively low guidelines ranges. Even given that, judges may still think 
the guidelines are on the harsh side for environmental defendants. One indication 
of this is revealed in Table 5: more than 85 percent of environmental defendants 
sentenced within the guidelines range receive the very lowest possible sentence in 
that range. In such cases, the sentencing judge is suggesting he or she thinks the 
guidelines range is appropriate, but only barely so. Again, the numbers are 
consistent with earlier data.50 
 
Table 5—Sentencing Within Range 
 
Fiscal Year Environmental Defendants 
Sentenced at Guideline Minimum 
(Percent) 
All Defendants Sentenced at 
Guideline Minimum (Percent) 
2004 84.9 60.0 
2005 88.5 59.2 
2006 79.4 58.7 
2007 89.8 58.9 
Average 85.6 59.2 
1997–200251 81.5 60.7 
 
                                                 
47  Category I is the lowest possible category. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
supra note 19, at § 5A. 
48  See O’Hear, supra note 1, at 205–07. 
49  Id. at 208. 
50  Id.  
51  Id. at 209. 
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Tables 6–9 present the data on sentences outside the guidelines range.52 For 
2004–2007, 50.3 percent of environmental defendants received below-range 
sentences, which is close to the 48.2 percent for 1995–2001,53 and considerably 
higher than the 32.2 percent for federal defendants overall.54 If government-
sponsored departures are excluded, then 23.5 percent of environmental defendants 
received departures or variances, compared with 15.3 percent for federal 
defendants overall.55 This underscores the extent to which judges (as opposed to 
prosecutors) are making the determination that the environmental guidelines are 
too harsh in many individual cases. 
 
Table 6—Downward Departure Rates for Sentenced Environmental 
Defendants 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Substantial 
Assistance 
Departures 
(Percent) 
Other Government-
Sponsored 
Departures (Percent) 
Judicial 
Departures 
(Percent) 
Total 
Downward 
Departures 
(Percent) 
2004 14.1 2.4 21.3 37.6 
2005 32.6 5.6 14.6 52.8 
2006 18.0 7.9 26.9 52.8 
2007 16.9 9.1 32.4 58.4 
Average 20.6 6.2 23.5 50.3 
 
Table 7—Downward Departure Rates for All Sentenced Federal Defendants 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Substantial 
Assistance 
Departures 
(Percent) 
Other Government-
Sponsored 
Departures (Percent) 
Judicial 
Departures 
(Percent) 
Total 
Downward 
Departures 
(Percent) 
2004 14.1 3.0 15.2 32.3 
2005 13.9 2.5 16.5 32.9 
2006 14.0 2.7 18.8 35.5 
2007 13.8 3.6 18.7 36.1 
Average 14.0 2.9 15.3 32.2 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52  The term “departure” is used here, although “variance” would be the preferred term 
for the latter portion of the covered period. 
53  See infra tbl.6; O’Hear, supra note 1, at 210 tbl.6. 
54  See infra tbl.7. 
55  See infra tbls.6 & 7. I refer to this rate as the “judicial departure” rate in the tables.  
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Table 8—Sentences of Environmental Defendants in Relation to Guideline 
Range 
 
Fiscal Year Below 
Guideline 
Range 
(Percent) 
Within 
Guideline 
Range 
(Percent) 
Above 
Guideline 
Range 
(Percent) 
Data 
Missing/Unknown 
(Percent) 
2004 37.6 54.1 0.0 8.2 
2005 52.8 40.4 0.0 6.7 
2006 52.8 43.8 0.0 3.3 
2007 58.4 39.0 0.0 2.6 
Average 50.3 44.4 0.0 5.3 
 
Table 9—Sentences of All Federal Defendants in Relation to Guideline Range 
 
Fiscal Year Below 
Guideline 
Range 
(Percent) 
Within 
Guideline 
Range 
(Percent) 
Above 
Guideline 
Range 
(Percent) 
Data 
Missing/Unknown 
(Percent) 
2004 25.2 66.9 0.7 7.1 
2005 32.9 60.8 1.3 5.0 
2006 35.5 59.7 1.6 3.3 
2007 36.1 58.3 1.5 4.1 
Average 32.5 61.4 1.3 4.9 
 
Figure 1 presents the overall data on below-range sentences since 1995. 
Although there is remarkable year-to-year variation in the environmental 
sentencing data (no doubt reflecting the relatively small number of environmental 
cases), a regular pattern of peaks and valleys is nonetheless apparent. In 
environmental cases, the below-range numbers have stayed consistently within the 
40 to 60 percent band, under both Clinton and Bush, and pre- and post-Booker. 
Given the track record of volatility in the data, it is too early to say whether the 
post-Booker highs represent a long-term plateau or just another short-term peak.56 
 
  
                                                 
56  Differences between the immediate pre- and post-Booker periods are not 
statistically significant even at the 90 percent confidence level. 
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Figure 1—Percentage of Defendants Sentenced Below the Guidelines Range 
 
 
 
What seems much more certain is that environmental defendants are far more 
likely to get a below-range sentence than federal defendants generally.57 Over the 
1995–2007 period—thirteen consecutive years—the below-range number for 
environmental defendants exceeds the general number, often by 20 percentage 
points or more. Indeed, the lowest single-year number for environmental 
defendants (in 2004) is still higher than the highest single-year number for all 
defendants (in 2007). The environmental disparity seems not to have been much 
affected either by Booker or the changeover in presidential administrations. 
Nor does this disparity seem to be a generalized phenomenon of white-collar 
sentencing. Figure 2, for instance, shows consistently higher departure rates for 
environmental defendants than for those sentenced under the basic guideline for 
economic crimes.58 Indeed, contrary to the common perception of preferential 
treatment for white-collar offenders, a comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows 
consistently lower percentages of below-range sentences for the theft/fraud 
defendants than for federal defendants generally. 
 
  
                                                 
57  Over the 1995–2007 period, the differences are statistically significant at better 
than a 99 percent confidence level. 
58  Section 2B1.1 covers theft, fraud, embezzlement, and the like. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 19, at § 2B1.1. 
All Defendants 
Environmental  
Defendants 
Year
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Figure 2—Percentage of Defendants Sentenced Below the Guidelines Range 
 
 
 
C.  The Judicial Discomfort Hypothesis 
 
Why do environmental defendants benefit from such a high rate of below-
range sentences? There are doubtless many causes, and a systematic, quantitative 
exploration of the question lies beyond the scope of this Article. This Section 
focuses on just one possible explanation: that judges are uncomfortable with the 
harshness of the guidelines in an unusually high proportion of environmental 
cases. To put the matter differently, I hope to make the case that below-range 
sentences in environmental cases result not only from the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in support of law enforcement priorities (e.g., rewarding substantial 
assistance), but also in large measure from the exercise of judicial discretion in 
support of judges’ views of what is a just sentence. 
Three categories of data reflect the judicial discomfort. First, and most 
important, is the judicial departure rate of 23.5 percent in environmental cases over 
the 2004–2007 period, more than 8 percentage points higher than the overall 
judicial departure rate.59 Although judicial departures in about a quarter of 
environmental cases may not at first blush seem indicative of high levels of 
judicial discomfort, the data need to be assessed in context. High rates of 
government-sponsored departures in environmental cases (26.8 percent60) mean 
that judges often have a readily available alternative to the guidelines range 
without needing to use the judicial departure mechanism. If cases with 
                                                 
59  See supra tbl.6. 
60  The 26.8 percentage comes from combining the average “Substantial Assistance 
Departures” and “Other Government-Sponsored Departures” from Table 6. 
Environmental  
Theft/Fraud  
Year
2009] ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AFTER BOOKER 1163 
government-sponsored departures are excluded, then the judicial departure rate 
increases to 32.1 percent.61 Additionally, both pre- and post-Booker, judges are apt 
to place a thumb on the scales in favor of within-range sentences. This may be for 
reasons both principled (e.g., a commitment to the ideal of sentencing uniformity 
that is embodied in the guidelines system) and expedient (e.g., a desire to avoid the 
heightened reversal risks associated with below-range sentences even post-
Booker62). Thus, whatever the number of judicial departures, there may be a 
sizeable number of additional cases in which the judge imposed the guidelines 
sentence despite real misgivings as to whether it was truly proportionate to the 
seriousness of the offense.63 
Second, the government-sponsored departure rate is also suggestive of 
judicial discomfort, although admittedly less clearly so. Even when the 
government supports a defendant’s request for a below-range sentence, the judge is 
still free to reject the request. To be sure, the request may be granted for reasons 
that have nothing to do with the merits of the environmental guidelines, e.g., the 
judge’s desire to encourage and reward substantial assistance. Yet a judge with a 
high level of confidence in the justness of a guidelines sentence will be less open 
to going below that sentence to further other policy objectives. Conversely, a judge 
who is already skeptical of the guidelines sentence will need correspondingly less 
persuasion. For that reason, it seems fair to view the high rate of government-
sponsored departures (26.8 percent in environmental cases, as opposed to 16.9 
percent overall64) as also reflecting an unusually high degree of judicial skepticism 
of the environmental guidelines. 
Third, there is the high rate of sentences at the very bottom of the guidelines 
range (85.6 percent in environmental cases, as against 59.2 percent overall65). In 
these cases, the judge suggests that the guidelines range only just barely overlaps 
with the range of what she would consider a just sentence—or that she is actually 
imposing (for reasons good or bad) a guidelines sentence that she feels is too 
harsh. Either way, these bottom-of-the-range sentences seem to reflect a 
widespread judicial view that the guidelines are not squarely hitting the mark when 
it comes to proportionate sentencing in environmental cases. 
 
  
                                                 
61  See supra tbl.6.  
62  See Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers, supra note 35, at 4–6 
(discussing data on sentencing appeals post-Booker). 
63  That the below-range sentences really are, in large measure, about proportionality 
issues is supported by the Commission’s compilation of reasons for departures in the pre-
Booker cases: putting substantial assistance to one side, the most frequently mentioned 
reasons for departure in environmental cases were related to culpability issues like harm 
and state of mind. O’Hear, supra note 1, at 210–12. 
64  See supra tbls.6 & 7. 
65  See supra tbl.5. 
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III.  NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BITE/BARK GAP 
 
Should we be concerned that the environmental guidelines have a bark that is 
worse than their bite? In this Part, I argue that Congress or the Sentencing 
Commission should take action to close the gap between bite and bark. Separately, 
in light of Rita and Kimbrough, I also consider the implications of the bite/bark 
data for the court system. 
 
A.  Implications for Congress and the Sentencing Commission 
 
If the gap between bark and bite were viewed as an important issue, Congress 
and the Sentencing Commission have tools available to address the problem. In 
particular, the guidelines might be made more binding (i.e., the bite brought into 
greater conformity with the bark) or the content of the guidelines might be 
modified (i.e., the bark brought into greater conformity with the bite). Before 
considering these responses, however, this Section will first address the option of 
doing nothing. 
 
1.  Do Nothing 
 
One might argue that the guidelines’ bark should be worse than their bite. The 
bark may be adequate to produce the desired deterrence effects, while the modest 
bite minimizes the various social costs associated with incarceration.66 There is 
something to be said for this position as a matter of abstract policy, but it plainly 
runs counter to the basic premises of the federal sentencing system. 
Through its adoption of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which replaced 
broad discretion with sentencing guidelines, Congress endorsed a deterrence 
approach that emphasizes certainty and predictability in punishment.67 More 
fundamentally, Congress recognized that unwarranted disparities in sentencing, 
such as treating similarly situated defendants differently, is not only unfair, but 
also undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.68 
                                                 
66  Such costs range from prison administration expenses to the harm suffered by 
children when a parent is removed from the home. 
67  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2006) (requiring Sentencing Commission to pay “particular 
attention” to ensuring “certainty . . . in sentencing”); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 49–50 (1985), 
as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3232–33 (“[T]he existing Federal system lacks 
the sureness that criminal justice must provide if it is to retain the confidence of American 
society and if it is to be an effective deterrent against crime.”); O’Hear, supra note 27, at 
769–70 (quoting Senator Kennedy, chief sponsor of legislation that became Sentencing 
Reform Act, on importance of “certainty of punishment” as “important prerequisite in any 
crime-fighting program”). 
68  See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 45–46 (1985), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3228–29. 
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Viewed in that light, the basic problems with the do-nothing approach are in 
the areas of transparency, predictability, and uniformity. Many environmental 
defendants receive variances in sentencing, but close to half do not. Under Rita, the 
latter defendants have little ability to challenge their sentences on appeal and 
ensure that variances are being distributed in a consistent, principled fashion.69 
Moreover, among the defendants who do get variances, Gall suggests there is little 
basis for the appellate courts to ensure consistency in the magnitude of variances.70 
In short, if we care about the reality or perception of unwarranted disparities in 
sentencing, we ought to feel troubled about our current environmental sentencing 
arrangements, in which variances are commonplace. 
 
2.  Make the Guidelines More Binding 
 
To address disparity concerns, Congress might make the environmental 
guidelines mandatory. This could be accomplished, notwithstanding Booker, by 
providing jury fact-finding of SOCs, or by restructuring the guidelines such that 
the existing sentencing ranges are converted into mandatory minimum sentences.71 
Of course, it would probably not be sufficient to restore the pre-Booker level of 
“bindingness”; recall that it is not clear that Booker even increased the rate of 
below-guidelines sentences relative to pre-Booker trends. But to make the 
environmental guidelines more mandatory even than they were pre-Booker would 
take us into uncharted and risky waters. Surely, there must be some discretion 
preserved for sentencing judges to consider truly unusual mitigating factors that 
have not been addressed in the guidelines range.72 
This points to a deeper problem with making the environmental guidelines 
more binding: they do a poor job of distinguishing between high- and low-
culpability defendants. I have critiqued the environmental guidelines at length 
                                                 
69  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007) (upholding presumption of 
reasonableness in favor of within-range sentences); see also id. at 2468 (“[W]hen a judge 
decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily 
require lengthy explanation.”). 
70  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (holding that even sentences 
“significantly outside the Guidelines range” must be reviewed “under a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard”). 
71  By the latter suggestion, I have in mind the proposal for so-called “topless” 
guidelines. See generally The Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, Recommendations 
for Federal Criminal Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 310, 311 
(2006) (describing the topless guideline proposal as one that “would have removed the tops 
of existing sentencing guidelines ranges in order to comply with the apparent requirements 
of Blakely v. Washington.”). 
72  The jury fact-finding option would also have drawbacks in terms of procedural 
cumbersomeness and prosecutorial control over which SOCs would be presented to the 
jury. 
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elsewhere.73 Briefly, the guidelines do not make important distinctions based on 
state of mind, while they assess harm and dangerousness in such a scattershot 
fashion that essentially harmless offenses can result in more serious sentences than 
life-threatening ones.74 Given these problems, it is hard not to think that a high 
variance rate in environmental cases may be warranted from a proportionality 
standpoint. Thus, even taking into account the prospect of greater uniformity, it is 
hard to summon much enthusiasm for any effort to make the existing guidelines 
more binding: the cure could be worse than the disease. 
 
3.  Revise the Guidelines 
 
I proposed a comprehensive revision of the environmental guidelines in my 
2004 study.75 The proposed new guideline, which is reprinted as Appendix A to 
this Article,76 offers a more coherent and systematic approach to assessing 
culpability. The new guideline would likely conform more closely to the moral 
intuitions of judges, thereby lessening the need for a high variance rate in our 
current relatively discretionary system and helping to close the bark/bite gap. And 
if the system became more mandatory, the proposed guidelines would help judges 
to avoid the excessive sentences that are sometimes called for by the existing 
guidelines in low-culpability cases. 
It would be redundant to restate my case for the proposed revisions at length, 
but there is a new objection that must be addressed now that could not have been 
made in 2004. Specifically, one might argue, there is no point in improving the 
guidelines because Booker has endowed judges with broad discretion to vary from 
them whenever the guidelines produce an unjust result. Put differently, the judges 
                                                 
73  See, e.g., O’Hear, supra note 1, at 154–80. 
74  Id. at 220–30. 
75  Id. at 270–72. Central to the case for reform, federal environmental laws establish a 
remarkably expansive system of criminal liability for “knowing” violations of the intricate 
system of regulations and permit conditions that govern the handling of hazardous 
substances and other pollutants in this country. Id. at 140–46. Indeed, the knowledge 
requirement is interpreted so broadly as to create a form of “quasi-strict” liability, 
permitting conviction for careless mistakes, record-keeping errors, and minor discharges 
that present no measurable risk of harm to human life or the environment. Id. at 146–54, 
159–80. The breadth of liability means that we must rely on the sentencing guidelines to 
sort out the truly serious violations from the inconsequential, the accidental, and the 
aberrational. 
76  This proposed guideline assumes that the sentencing guidelines as a whole retain 
their existing architecture. I have argued elsewhere for more thoroughgoing reform of the 
sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Guidelines Simplification Still an 
Urgent Priority, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 347 (2008). I have also proposed a different version 
of my environmental guideline that could be adapted for use in a simplified guidelines 
system. See Michael M. O’Hear, Criminal Violations of Environmental Laws: Model 
Sentencing Guidelines §2E1, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 341 (2006). 
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will do what the judges will do, so why bother fixing problems with the 
guidelines? 
This objection, however, misses both the intrinsic value of low variance rates 
and the continued “gravitational pull” of the guidelines in the post-Booker/post-
Rita sentencing process. First, even if the guidelines have no substantive effect, it 
would still be helpful for the guidelines to be modified so as to bring them into 
closer alignment with what judges are actually doing. Doing so would advance the 
congressional goal of predictability in sentencing.77 Even guidelines that are, in 
effect, merely descriptive of typical practices still serve the useful purpose of 
providing everyone fair notice of the punishment that is likely to result from any 
given criminal conduct. Moreover, legitimizing goals may also be served by the 
perception—even if inaccurate—that the guidelines are constraining judicial 
discretion and reducing the risks of arbitrary outcomes.78 In that sense, too, there 
may be intrinsic value to a system in which variance rates are low. 
Second, despite Booker, it is not plausible that the guidelines are substantively 
irrelevant in the determination of sentences. To appreciate why and how the 
guidelines still matter in a post-Booker world, it may be helpful to distinguish 
among three types of cases in a simplified model of judicial decision making: no-
deference cases, total-deference cases, and limited-deference cases. In no-
deference cases, as a result of some combination of judicial temperament and other 
factors, the judge will have strong feelings about the proper sentence and will 
reach the desired outcome regardless of the guidelines. 
At the opposite extreme, in total-deference cases, the judge will simply follow 
the guidelines with little serious consideration of alternatives. Although the judge 
is endowed with expanded discretion post-Booker, the judge is still required to 
calculate the guidelines range,79 and, having invested the effort in doing so, the 
judge will naturally be inclined to pay some attention to the result.80 Moreover, the 
judge will realize that following the guidelines remains the path of least resistance. 
Under Rita, the guidelines sentence will usually be affirmed with little or no need 
to create an additional record beyond the guidelines calculation itself.81 In contrast, 
the below-guidelines sentence will most likely have to be justified in a more 
                                                 
77  See O’Hear, supra note 27, at 797, 800 (discussing importance of predictability in 
the Sentencing Reform Act and Feeney Amendment). 
78  Cf. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining & Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 
407, 421, 428 (2008) (discussing relationship between perceived legitimacy of decision-
making process and use of objective criteria as basis for explaining decision). 
79  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin 
all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” 
(citation omitted)). 
80  Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 473–75 
(2009). 
81  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007) 
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extensive fashion and, even at that, faces a substantial risk of reversal on appeal.82 
Given these realities of post-Booker sentencing, it is easy to see why a judge would 
be inclined just to defer to the guidelines, particularly if the judge otherwise lacks 
strong feelings about the case.83 
In the middle are the limited-deference cases: the guidelines will get some 
meaningful weight in the sentencing calculus, but there is no ex ante commitment 
just to follow the guidelines and be done with it. Variance arguments will get due 
consideration—although, if there is a variance, the judge is not likely to move far 
from the guidelines range. 
It is, of course, self-evidently worthwhile to get the guidelines right for 
purposes of the total-deference cases—that is, if there is any substantial number of 
such cases. It is not possible to determine with any precision how common such 
cases are, although the features of post-Booker sentencing discussed above provide 
good reason to believe they are not infrequent. Moreover, a number of the 
published post-Booker cases, including Rita itself, seem to reflect a very high level 
of judicial deference to the guidelines.84 
Even if one believes the number of total-deference cases to be small, it would 
still be worthwhile to get the guidelines right for the limited-deference cases—and 
this category is surely not small. With the special weight given to the guidelines in 
post-Booker sentencing processes, it is hard to believe that judges are giving the 
guidelines no substantive deference at all. And, to the extent the guidelines are 
given meaningful weight—which might manifest itself as a de facto presumption 
against variance or as a disinclination to vary far from the guidelines range—we 
should want them to reflect a coherent, principled approach to punishment. 
 
4.  Summary 
 
We should be concerned about the bite/bark gap in environmental sentencing 
in light of the transparency and uniformity goals of the federal sentencing system. 
It makes little sense, however, to address this problem in a way that would push 
judges to adhere more closely to guidelines that do not appropriately distinguish 
between high- and low-culpability defendants as there is no good reason to favor 
uniformity over proportionality. Revised environmental guidelines with a more 
coherent approach to culpability can advance both objectives: high-deference 
                                                 
82  See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (“If [the sentencing judge] decides that an outside-
Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure 
that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”); 
Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers, supra note 35, at 5–6 (discussing 
data on sentencing appeals post-Booker). 
83  See United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting “the 
temptation to a busy judge to impose the guidelines sentence and be done with it”). 
84  See O’Hear, supra note 80, at 466–67 (noting how little attention district court 
judge seemed to pay to variance argument in Rita). 
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judges will more reliably impose proportionate sentences, while low-deference 
judges will more reliably impose uniform sentences.85 
 
B.  Implications for the Courts 
 
If the Sentencing Commission does not act to reform the environmental 
guidelines, individual sentencing judges can and should use their enhanced post-
Booker discretion to reject disproportionate guidelines sentences, while appellate 
courts should also be especially wary of sentencing judges who simply follow the 
environmental guidelines without regard to plausible variance arguments. To be 
sure, even in the pre-Booker period, sentencing judges could (and with surprising 
frequency did) depart in environmental cases to avoid troubling results. But two 
features of the pre-Booker doctrinal landscape made it difficult to imagine the 
courts systematically playing an effective role as guarantors of proportionality. 
First, absent prosecutorial support, sentencing judges were prohibited from 
departing from the guidelines except on the basis of unusual case-specific facts that 
had not been adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating 
the environmental guidelines.86 Thus, judges could not depart in cases that 
appeared to be routine, or factually typical. Second, appellate courts could not 
review a sentencing judge’s decision not to depart from the guidelines.87 
Both of these critical features of the pre-Booker landscape have been 
eliminated. First, in Kimbrough, the Supreme Court indicated that a judge may 
impose a below-guidelines sentence even in a typical crack cocaine case on the 
basis of the judge’s disagreement with the harshness of the crack guidelines.88 It is 
true, of course, that the crack guidelines have a unique history, and some lower 
courts have accordingly suggested that Kimbrough may be limited to that, or a very 
similar, context.89 In particular, the Kimbrough Court itself emphasized, “The 
crack cocaine guidelines . . . do not exemplify the [Sentencing] Commission’s 
exercise of its characteristic institutional role. In formulating Guidelines ranges for 
                                                 
85  To be sure, my emphasis on proportionality tends to exclude the sort of attention-
getting extreme sentence that might be thought to have particular value in deterring 
environmental violations. As I have argued elsewhere, however, the deterrence effects of 
harsh punishment may be much less important in securing compliance with environmental 
laws than the overall moral credibility of the regulatory system, which is weakened, not 
strengthened, by disproportionate sentences. O’Hear, supra note 1, at 253–55. 
86  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006). 
87  See, e.g., United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 708 (1st Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Caban, 173 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1999). 
88  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–02 (2007). 
89  See, e.g., United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(“Kimbrough dealt only with certain Guidelines—those that, like the crack cocaine 
Guidelines, ‘do not exemplify the [Sentencing] Commission’s exercise of its characteristic 
institutional role.’” (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101–02)). 
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crack cocaine offenses . . . the [Sentencing] Commission . . . did not take account 
of ‘empirical data and national experience.’”90 
Yet even if the Kimbrough power to reject a guideline in routine cases is 
limited to guidelines in which the Sentencing Commission has not exercised its 
“characteristic institutional role,” the environmental guidelines would still qualify. 
As the Court itself suggested in Kimbrough, the Sentencing Commission’s 
characteristic role is to base guidelines on empirical analysis of actual sentencing 
practices.91 The environmental guidelines, however, were not based on actual 
sentencing practices,92 and they continue to be out of step with what judges are 
actually doing in environmental cases. The Sentencing Commission’s failure to 
play its characteristic role thus qualifies environmental defendants for Kimbrough 
variances even on a cautious reading of Kimbrough. 
Second, as Rita affirmed, a sentencing judge’s post-Booker decision not to 
vary is now subject to appellate review for “reasonableness.”93 To be sure, as Rita 
also affirmed, the appellate court may accord a presumption of reasonableness to a 
within-range sentence.94 The presumption, however, is a rebuttable one.95 
Moreover, there are good reasons to treat the presumption as a particularly weak 
one in the environmental sentencing context. The Rita Court found the 
presumption an appropriate way to recognize that the guidelines embody a “rough 
approximation” of the statutory purposes of sentencing.96 Thus, the Court once 
again emphasized the empirical foundation of the guidelines, as well as the 
evolutionary process by which the Sentencing Commission may amend the 
guidelines based on actual sentencing practices.97 As to guidelines (like the 
environmental guidelines) that do not, in fact, emerge from the Sentencing 
Commission playing this “characteristic role,” the justification for the presumption 
                                                 
90  Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101–02 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 
1171 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
91  For a description of the Sentencing Commission’s “empirical approach,” see 
O’Hear, supra note 27, at 780. 
92  O’Hear, supra note 1, at 201 nn.366 & 368; see also Paul D. Kamenar, The 
Environmental Sentencing Guidelines Are Fatally Flawed and Unreasonable, 8 MD. J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 103–05 (1997) (arguing that environmental guidelines violate 
congressional mandate requiring Sentencing Commission to consider past sentencing 
practices in developing guidelines). 
93  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358–60 (reviewing within-range sentence 
using reasonableness standard). 
94  Id. at 347. 
95  Id. at 336. Moreover, Rita only permits, and does not require, appellate courts to 
employ the presumption. See id. at 340 (“The most important question before us is whether 
the law permits the courts of appeals to use this presumption. We hold that it does.” 
(emphasis added)). 
96  Id. at 349–51. 
97  Id. at 349. 
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of reasonableness is particularly attenuated, and the presumption should be given 
little weight in the appellate review process. 
Thus, the new post-Booker landscape provides a more favorable doctrinal 
framework for both district court and appellate court judges to enforce basic 
principles of proportionality in sentencing, even where the guidelines call for 
disproportionate outcomes. And if judges continue to take advantage of this 
framework with increasing frequency in environmental cases, perhaps the 
Sentencing Commission will finally feel obliged to act pursuant to the evolutionary 
model extolled by Rita and revise the environmental guidelines in light of actual 
practices. 
To be sure, if the courts follow the path I suggest here, there may be an 
increase in the variance rate in environmental cases, which might be seen as 
sacrificing uniformity for proportionality. On the other hand, when variance rates 
are already extraordinarily high, there seems little to lose on the uniformity front. 
Indeed, when variances are granted in more than half of environmental cases (as 
has happened every year so far since Booker), it may be that uniformity interests 
are advanced, not undermined, by a further increase in the variance rates. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The gap between the bark and the bite of the environmental sentencing 
guidelines remains high post-Clinton presidency and post-Booker. I suspect that 
some environmentalists will see in this data a reason to support mandatory 
minimums or other measures that will better ensure substantial prison sentences for 
environmental offenders. I see the problem, however, not necessarily as one of 
inadequate severity, but as one of inadequate transparency and uniformity. 
Mandatory minimums may address these concerns, but likely at too great a cost in 
proportionality. Long prison terms for violations that are accidental or minimally 
harmful diminish the moral credibility of the regulatory system. It would be 
preferable to redesign the environmental guidelines so that they better assure 
lenient sentences for low-culpability violators. Redesigned guidelines along these 
lines would have more credibility both with judges (who might then be more 
inclined to defer to the guidelines when they do call for harsh sentences) and with 
the regulated community (which might then view the environmental regulatory 
regime as fairer and more legitimate). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Proposal for Revised Environmental Guideline to Replace  
Sections 2Q1.1, 1.2, & 1.3 
§2Q1.1 Mishandling of Hazardous or Toxic Substances, Pesticides, and 
Other Regulated Environmental Pollutants; Recordkeeping, Tampering, and 
Falsification 
 
(a) Base Offense Level: 6 
 
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
 Defendant’s 
Purpose Was 
to Cause 
Threatened 
Type of Harm 
Defendant 
Knew Harm 
Was 
Practically 
Certain to 
Result 
Defendant 
Recklessly 
Disregarded 
Risk of Harm 
Defendant 
Negligently 
Disregarded 
Risk of Harm 
Imminent 
Danger of Death 
or Serious 
Bodily Harm 
Increase by  
22 levels 
Increase by 
18 levels 
Increase by 
14 levels 
Increase by  
8 levels 
Imminent 
Danger of 
Large-Scale 
Environmental 
Harm 
Increase by  
18 levels 
Increase by 
14 levels 
Increase by 
10 levels 
Increase by  
4 levels 
Imminent 
Danger of 
Localized 
Environmental 
Harm 
Increase by  
14 levels 
Increase by 
10 levels 
Increase by 
6 levels 
No Increase 
Lesser Degree 
of Danger of 
Environmental 
Harm 
Increase by  
12 levels 
Increase by  
8 levels 
Increase by 
4 levels 
Decrease by 
2 levels 
Danger of 
Regulatory 
Harm Only 
Increase by  
8 levels 
Increase by  
4 levels 
No Increase Decrease by 
4 levels 
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Application Notes: 
 
1. The purpose of this section is to establish sentences for environmental 
offenders that are proportionate to their culpability, based chiefly on three 
considerations: the magnitude of the harm threatened by the offense, the likelihood 
that the harm would occur, and the offender’s intent with respect to the threatened 
harm. These considerations are reflected in the two-dimensional matrix for specific 
offense characteristics. The vertical axis distinguishes among offenders based on 
the severity of the harm threatened and the likelihood of that harm occurring. 
These should be measured according to reasonable expectations as to the 
consequences of the offense, i.e., what a reasonable person with the defendant’s 
knowledge at the time of the offense would expect would happen as a result of the 
offense. The horizontal axis distinguishes among offenders based on their state of 
mind as to the threatened harms. 
 
2. “Environmental harm” means any non-trivial injury caused by the 
introduction of hazardous substances or other pollutants into the environment. The 
term includes such categories of harm as physical injury and emotional distress 
suffered by human beings, diminution in property values, environmental 
remediation expenses, disruptions to business or other social activities, permanent 
damage to the integrity of an ecosystem, and death of plants and animals. 
 
3. “Large-scale environmental harm” means environmental harm on a scale that 
might fairly be thought of as “disastrous.” In determining whether threatened 
harms are on this scale, the following considerations may be relevant: the 
geographical scale of the harm, the duration of the harm, the irreparability of the 
harm, the possibility of physical injury to human beings, the number of people 
affected, the number of plants and animals affected, and the economic value of the 
harm. Examples of large-scale environmental harm include: irreparable destruction 
of hundreds of acres of ecologically rich wetlands; exposure of dozens of people to 
a highly toxic substance; evacuation of an entire town for more than a month; and 
the closure of a popular beach for a year, with catastrophic financial losses for 
local businesses. 
 
4. “Localized environmental harm” means substantial environmental harm that 
does not reach the level of “large-scale environmental harm.” Examples of 
localized environmental harm include soil and groundwater contamination that can 
be contained and remediated so as to prevent significant human health risks; death 
of a small number of animals, without long-term threats to the viability of a 
population or an ecosystem; and discharges of air or water pollution that may 
contribute to violations of air or water quality standards. 
 
5. “Regulatory harm” means harm to the integrity of the environmental 
regulatory system. Environmental violations that do not threaten environmental 
harm, including some reporting and recordkeeping violations, will nonetheless 
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generally threaten regulatory harms. Regulatory harms may include the costs to 
regulatory and enforcement agencies of investigating and prosecuting the 
underlying environmental violation; impairment of the ability of governmental 
agencies, legislatures, and scientific bodies to monitor, assess, and respond 
appropriately to environmental risks; and loss of public confidence in the 
effectiveness of the environmental regulatory system. While regulatory harms 
should generally be regarded as less severe than environmental harms, they may be 
appropriately considered at sentencing, particularly, as indicated in the culpability 
matrix, where the offender has purposefully or knowingly acted so as to undermine 
the integrity of the regulatory system. 
 
6. The categories on the vertical axis should not be employed in a mechanistic 
fashion, but, rather, so as to effectuate the goal of the vertical axis, i.e., the 
assessment of relative culpability based on the harm threatened and the likelihood 
that the threatened harm would occur. If the culpability of the offender’s conduct is 
not adequately captured by any of the five categories, then an upward or downward 
departure should be employed, consistent with the basic structure of the matrix. 
Thus, for instance, if the offense conduct created an imminent danger of 
environmental harm that is clearly in excess of localized harm, but also clearly less 
than large-scale harm, the court should enhance the offense level to a midway 
point between localized and large-scale harm. 
 
7. The vertical axis reflects threatened harm, not actual harm. Harm that actually 
occurred may, however, have some probative value in determining whether the 
threat of a particular harm was imminent. Moreover, where actual harm clearly and 
substantially differs from threatened harm, an upward or downward departure 
along the vertical axis to a midrange point between the actual and threatened harm 
may be appropriate. 
 
8. The horizontal, state-of-mind axis relates to the offender’s knowledge and 
intent with respect to the threatened harms. The four categories are intended to 
track the basic mens rea categories of the Model Penal Code. 
 
9. If the offender’s violation of the law was a result of a justifiable 
misunderstanding of the law, a downward departure may be appropriate to the 
extent that the misunderstanding mitigates the offender’s culpability. A departure 
on this basis will normally be limited to circumstances in which the offense 
conduct threatens no more than localized environmental harm and the offense 
conduct is otherwise reasonable. A misunderstanding of the law is not justifiable 
unless it is based on an authoritative interpretation of the law from an appropriate 
governmental agency, and no contrary authoritative interpretation is available at 
the time of the offense. The reasonability of the offender’s conduct should be 
assessed by reference to the severity of the harm threatened by the conduct, the 
likelihood of the harm occurring, the extent to which the risk of harm was merely 
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to the offender’s own person or property, the social benefits of the offender’s 
conduct (if any), and the availability of cost-effective alternatives to the offender’s 
conduct that would have reduced or eliminated the threat of harm. 
